Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 3

2005

Decretal Language: Last Words of an Appellate
Opinion
Hon. Jon O. Newman

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Hon. Jon O. Newman, Decretal Language: Last Words of an Appellate Opinion, 70 Brook. L. Rev. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol70/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 2

1/13/2005 3:25:14 PM

Decretal Language

LAST WORDS OF AN APPELLATE OPINION

*

Jon O. Newman†
Two years ago, I prepared a memorandum for the judges
of the Second Circuit discussing various aspects of decretal
language and some of the choices available to judges in
wording the concluding sentence of their opinions. It has been
suggested that the discussion might be of use to other judges
and the bar, and I have therefore adapted the memorandum
into the following Article. 1. What is “decretal language”?
“Decretal language” is the portion of a court’s judgment or
order that officially states (“decrees”) what the court is
ordering. In a judgment or order, decretal language usually
begins with the formula “It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and
decreed that . . . .”
This Article will consider the portion of an appellate
court’s opinion, usually the concluding sentence, that states
what a court of appeals is ordering. The wording of such a portion should probably be called “opinion decretal language” to
distinguish it from “judgment decretal language,” but in this
article, such language will be called simply “decretal language.”
2. Clarity. The first rule is clarity. The decretal
language must tell the district judge what the appellate court
wants done. Phrases such as “judgment in accordance with
opinion” or “judgment in conformity with opinion” should be
avoided if practicable, although they are sometimes used,
especially where the opinion includes complicated language.1
*
†
1

© 2005 Judge Jon O. Newman. All Rights Reserved.
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 53 F.3d 549, 565 (2d Cir. 1995)
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Similarly, lawyers would be well advised to tell appellate
courts precisely what relief they are seeking.
3. Consistency. The decretal language should be consistent throughout the opinion, i.e., in the “syllabus” that immediately follows the caption, in any summary of the disposition in
the opening paragraphs of the opinion, and in the “conclusion.”
There is no need, however, for the language of the syllabus or
the opening paragraphs to be as detailed as the language in the
conclusion. The conclusion is the place where the decretal language should be stated completely and with precision. For example, the syllabus might say only “Affirmed in part; reversed
in part and remanded.”
4. Affirmance. If a judgment is to be affirmed, the
decretal language of an appellate opinion need say only “The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
5. Vacatur or Reversal. If a judgment is to be undone, at
least in some respect, there is a difference of opinion among
judges as to the circumstances in which “vacated” or “reversed”
should be used in decretal language. However, in three
circumstances, there is virtual unanimity as to which of these
verbs should be used:
(a) If the appellate ruling orders the complete opposite of
what the district court has ruled, e.g., the district court has
entered judgment for the plaintiff (for example, on a motion for
summary judgment) and the court of appeals orders entry of
judgment for the defendant (for example, a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal for failure to state a claim), the decretal language
should include the word “reversed.” An appropriate form would
be “The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case
[or the appeal or the cause] is remanded with directions to
enter judgment for the defendant.”
(b) If the appellate ruling rejects interim relief ordered
by the district court (for example, a preliminary injunction), the
decretal language should include the word “vacated.” An
appropriate form would be “The order of the district court
issuing a preliminary injunction is vacated” or sometimes just
“The injunction issued by the district court is vacated.”
(c) If the appellate ruling rejects a sentence imposed by
the district court and the appellate court chooses to undo the

(“Judgment in accordance with opinion.”); Hight v. United States, 256 F.2d 795, 802
(2d Cir. 1958) (“[J]udgment in conformity with this opinion.”).
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sentence, rather than order the district court to undo it,2 the
decretal language should include the word “vacated.”3 An
appropriate form would be “The sentence is vacated, and the
case is remanded for resentencing consistent with this
opinion.”
In the many circumstances where an appellate court
rejects a final judgment of a district court but does not order
the complete opposite of what the district court has done (i.e.,
does not direct judgment for the appellant), the practices of
appellate judges vary as to whether the decretal language
should include the word “vacated” or “reversed.” Some judges
believe that “reversed” should never be used unless the
appellate court directs the complete opposite of what the
district court has ordered. For these judges, whenever the
appellate ruling is in favor of the appellant but orders anything
less than the complete opposite of what the district court has
ruled (for example, the district court has entered summary
judgment for the plaintiff and the court of appeals rules that a
factual issue exists that requires a trial), the decretal language
will include the word “vacated.” An appropriate form would be
“The judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case [or
the appeal or the cause] is remanded for trial [or for further
proceedings].” Even these judges, however, will frequently say
that they are “reversing” the ruling that grants summary
judgment for the plaintiff, but are “vacating” the judgment that
was entered based on that ruling.
Other judges believe that “reversed” is appropriate
whenever the appellate court, on an appeal from a final
judgment, rules in favor of the appellant, even though the
appellant does not win the complete opposite of the district
court’s ruling. For these judges, an appropriate form in the
example just given would be “The judgment of the district court
is reversed, and the case [or the appeal or the cause] is
remanded for trial [or for further proceedings].”
There is very little case law on the issue of “reversed”
versus “vacated.” In Mickens v. Taylor4 Justice Scalia’s opinion
for the Supreme Court emphasized that a prior ruling of the
Court in Wood v. Georgia5 had only “vacated” the judgment of

2
3
4
5

See para. 7, infra.
But see para. 8, infra.
535 U.S. 162 (2002).
450 U.S. 261 (1981).
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the lower court and had remanded for further proceedings (an
inquiry concerning an allegedly conflicted counsel), rather than
“reversed” and overturned a conviction.6 The implication of
Justice Scalia’s language is that “reversed” would have been
appropriate if the prior ruling had overturned the conviction,
but it should be noted that such a ruling would only have
required a new trial, not a final judgment in favor of the
defendant.
The Supreme Court has frequently used “reversed” in
the decretal language of an opinion, even though the opinion
did not direct entry of judgment for the appellant.7
I have not found a decision that attached any
significance to the use of “reversed,” rather than “vacated,”
where the appellant prevailed on the issues raised on appeal
but did not win a district court judgment in its favor.
In Dart v. United States8 the District of Columbia
Circuit held that statutory language authorizing the Secretary
of Commerce to “vacate or modify” the decisions of
administrative law judges did not empower the Secretary to
reverse such decisions, and that where an ALJ had decided not
to award sanctions, the Secretary’s order that the judgment be
modified so as to award sanctions constituted an impermissible
reversal of the ALJ’s decision.9
In Kelso v. U.S. Department of State10 the district court
offered the following explanation: “Although the word reverse
shares vacate’s meanings of to annul and to set aside, it has an
additional, more extensive definition: ‘To reverse a judgment
means to overthrow it by contrary decision, make it void, undo
or annul it for error.’”11
6. Affirmed or reversed (or vacated) in part. Whenever
an appellate decision affirms part of a district court’s ruling
and reverses (or vacates) part of that ruling, the decretal
language should specify which parts are affirmed and which
parts are reversed [or vacated]. “Affirmed in part and reversed
in part” is not sufficient in the decretal language (although it
6

Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 n.3.
See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509
(2001) (remand for reconsideration of res judicata defense under applicable state law
standard); Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 437 (2001) (remand for
reconsideration of immunity defense under proper standard).
8
848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
9
Id. at 227-31.
10
13 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 1998).
11
Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
7

1/13/2005 3:25:14 PM

2005]

DECRETAL LANGUAGE

731

will do in the “syllabus,” the short explanation of the nature of
the appeal and the disposition that appears in the slip opinion
just below the caption).
7. Remands. In every instance where an appellate court
reverses or vacates (either in whole or in part), the decretal
language should include language that remands the case to the
district court (although the absence of the word “remand” in a
judgment that “reverses” has been held not to deprive the
district court of jurisdiction to act),12. The remand language
should tell the district judge what is to be done. Usually, some
precise task will be identified, e.g., “remanded for further
findings,” “remanded with directions to grant leave to amend
the complaint,” or “remanded for trial.” When an appellate
court reverses (or vacates) a grant of summary judgment, the
remand sometimes directs a trial, but in some circumstances
the appellate court simply wants to permit more discovery with
the possibility of a renewed motion for summary judgment, in
which event the remand directs “further proceedings.”
Two forms of catch-all remands have also been used:
“remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion”13 and “remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.”14 I have seen no case law that attached a
consequence to the choice between these two catch-all
formulations. Some judges believe that the “consistent with”
formulation is a somewhat more confining direction to the
district judge. The Supreme Court has used both formulations.15
The “consistent with” and “not inconsistent with”
formulations appear to have come into use in an earlier era
before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which now provide that the mandate of the Court of
Appeals includes the opinion, as well as the judgment.16 In Gulf
Refining Co, v. U.S.,17 before the adoption of Rule 41, the
Supreme Court ruled that “the direction to proceed consistently
with the opinion of the court has the effect of making the

12

See Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 137 F.3d 1475, 148384 (Fed. Cir. 1998))
13
E.g., Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted).
14
E.g., Weiler v. Chatham Forest Products, Inc., 370 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir.
2004).
15
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“not inconsistent
with”); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 422 (2002) (“consistent with”).
16
See FED. R. APP. P. 41.
17
269 U.S. 125 (1925).

1/13/2005 3:25:14 PM

732

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3

opinion a part of the mandate, as though it had been therein
set out at length.”18
8. Sentences. When an appellate ruling rejects some
aspect of a district judge’s sentence, an issue arises as to
whether the order vacating the sentence should be entered by
the appellate court or the district court. If the appellate court
vacates the sentence, there is then no sentence, and
circumstances might arise where the appellate court would not
wish to leave the defendant unsentenced in the interim before
resentencing occurs. In such circumstances, it is sometimes
preferable for the appellate court not to vacate the sentence but
simply to remand to the district court with instructions
concerning the sentence; that way, the sentence remains in
place until changed by the district court. In altering a sentence,
an appellate court should consider whether it wants to alter
one part of the sentence and leave the remainder in place, or
alter one part and grant the district judge discretion to reshape
the entire sentence de novo.19
9. Modification. Sometimes an appellate ruling effects a
change in a district court ruling without either vacating or
reversing. Instead, the appellate ruling “modifies” the appealed
judgment. For example, an appellate change in the wording of
an injunction might say “The order of the District Court issuing
the injunction is modified by deleting paragraph 7, and as
modified the order is affirmed.”20
10. Dismissal. If a court of appeals does not have
appellate jurisdiction over the appeal, the appeal should be
dismissed. “Dismissed” is the appropriate word in decretal
language when an appeal is dismissed as untimely, or because
the judgment or order appealed from is not final and no basis
exists for appeal from a non-final order. Other circumstances
where an appeal should be dismissed are unsuccessful
attempts to obtain review of orders denying judgment for a
defendant on the basis of qualified immunity,21 or unsuccessful
attempts to obtain review of a sentencing judge’s discretionary

18

Id. at 135. See also U.S. v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 24 F.2d 206, 207
(S.D. Cal. 1927) (same).
19
See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002).
20
See, e.g., Guzman v. Bevona, 90 F.3d 641, 650 (2d Cir. 1996); United States
v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 1988).
21
E.g., Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 170 (2d Cir. 2001).
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decision not to depart from an applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range.22
11. “Appeal” versus “review.” In the course of framing
decretal language, courts should distinguish between the terms
“appeal” and “review.” “Appeal” is the proper term for referring
to the process by which an appellate court exercises its
jurisdiction over an appealable judgment or order; “review” is
the proper term for referring to the action of an appellate court
in considering an issue or ruling comprehended within an
appeal. For example, on an appeal from a judgment in favor of
a defendant after a jury verdict, the plaintiff-appellant might
contend that the district court erred in denying its motion to
amend the complaint. In such circumstances, it would be
incorrect for the decretal language to say, after affirming the
judgment, “And we also affirm on the appeal from the denial of
the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.” There is no
“appeal” from the ruling denying the motion to amend. The
“appeal” is from the final judgment, and on that appeal, the
court of appeals “reviews” the denial of the motion to amend.
Thus, appropriate language would be “And on review of the
ruling denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint,
we affirm” or, more simply, “And we affirm the denial of the
plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.”
12. Identifying the district court ruling. Whatever the
appellate disposition, the decretal language should be careful
to refer correctly to the nature of the district court ruling, i.e.,
whether it is a “judgment” or an “order.” And when referring to
a district court’s judgment or order by its date, the operative
date is the date on which the judgment or order was entered on
the docket of the district court, not the date when the district
judge signed the opinion or the date when the clerk filed the
judgment.23 The date that the judgment or order was entered
can be ascertained from the district court’s docket entries.24
13. Review of agency rulings. On applications to review
administrative agencies like the National Labor Relations
Board, which come to a court of appeals on a “petition for
review” or the Board’s “petition to enforce,” the decretal
language is either “petition to review granted, and the order of
the Board is vacated [sometimes with a remand]” or “petition
22

E.g., United States v. Aponte, 235 F.3d 802, 803 (2d Cir. 2000).
See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
24
See Houston v. Greiner, 174 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing form of
docket entries).
23
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for review denied” or “petition for enforcement granted” or
“petition for enforcement denied.”
14. Motions. For disposition of motions, the decretal
language, entered on the motion itself, is usually just “motion
granted” or “motion denied.”
15. Returning a case to the same panel. Sometimes the
panel deciding an appeal wants a subsequent appeal in the
litigation assigned to it. The most common circumstance is
where the panel has remanded for a finding. Having invested
time considering the issues in the appeal, the panel will
normally want the case returned to it after the needed finding
has been made. Sometimes the panel wants a subsequent
appeal in the litigation to come before it, regardless of what
prompted the remand.
The language used to accomplish a return of the case to
the panel deciding the initial appeal should be carefully
considered. Some panels have been using formulas such as
“This panel will retain jurisdiction,”25 “Jurisdiction will be
retained by this panel,”26 or simply “Jurisdiction is retained.”27
These formulations should be avoided. They are jurisdictionally
incorrect. A court of appeals cannot simultaneously “retain”
jurisdiction and send the case back to a district court for some
further action. Whenever the panel wants a district court to
take any further action in the case, jurisdiction must be
restored to the district court. This occurs by means of the
issuance of a mandate by the court of appeals. The “retain”
wording is a euphemism that really means “This panel will
reacquire jurisdiction after the required action has been taken.”
Bringing a case back to the original panel can be
accomplished in either of two ways:
(a) If the panel remands for a specific task such as a
finding, the usual technique is to “vacate and remand” and add
something like “After the district court has made the finding
required by this opinion, jurisdiction will automatically be
restored to this Court without the need for an additional notice
of appeal; the returned appeal will be assigned to this panel.”
or “After the district court has made the required finding,
either party may restore jurisdiction to this Court by notifying
the Clerk of this Court by letter that the finding has been
25
26
27

E.g., United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
E.g., Cardillo v. United States, 767 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1985).
E.g., Abrams v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 938 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1991).

1/13/2005 3:25:14 PM

2005]

DECRETAL LANGUAGE

735

made, and the returned appeal will be assigned to this panel.
An additional notice of appeal will not be needed.” In the
Second Circuit, this technique is known as a Jacobson
remand28. It is used when the case is almost certainly going to
return, and there is no need for a second notice of appeal
(which, in addition to requiring an additional docketing fee,
risks confusion in the clerk’s office because there will then be
two docket numbers for what is really the same appeal; every
notice of appeal precipitates a new docket number). However
worded, a Jacobson remand should specify the procedure for
returning the case to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. It
is often useful to add something like “If any circumstances
obviate the need for the case to return to the court of appeals,
the parties shall promptly notify the Clerk of this Court.”
(b) If the panel remands for some more general purpose,
such as a retrial, but wants a subsequent appeal, if it occurs,
assigned to it, the appropriate language, in addition to “vacated
and remanded for a new trial” is something like “In the event of
a subsequent appeal, the matter will be assigned to this panel.”
In the Second Circuit, if no direction concerning
assignment to the original panel is stated and an appeal is
taken that relates to a prior appeal, the clerk’s office will assign
the appeal to the next panel that includes one judge of the
Second Circuit who was a member of the prior panel.
16. Costs. It is usually helpful to make a decision as to
appellate costs at the time an opinion is filed. FRAP 39(a)
provides that, unless the court otherwise directs, if the
judgment or order is affirmed, the appellee recovers its costs; if
the judgment or order is reversed, the appellant recovers its
costs; if there is a mixed outcome, e.g., “affirmed in part and
vacated in part,” or if the judgment is vacated or modified,
neither party is awarded costs. It should be noted that use of
the word “vacated” without any direction for costs has the
effect of denying costs. All of these costs outcomes can be
altered by direction of the court of appeals.
If nothing is said about costs in the decretal language,
the panel will usually be burdened by a motion from one side or
the other (or both) to award costs or to disallow costs. It is
simpler to take care of the matter in the original opinion. If the
opinion directs a mixed outcome, appellate costs can be
apportioned, e.g., “The appellant may recover 2/3 of its costs.”
28

See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-23 (2d Cir. 1994)
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Sometimes a panel will disallow costs even though the
prevailing party is normally entitled to them. This has
happened, for example, when an impoverished appellant with a
non-frivolous claim loses to a large corporation. In that
circumstance, the decretal language sometimes says “No costs.”
The fact that a party has been permitted to appeal in
forma pauperis does not exempt it from appellate costs; in
forma pauperis status exempts a party only from the obligation
to prepay required fees.29
17. Sanctions for frivolous appeal. If an appeal is
deemed frivolous, an appellate court may award damages
(usually, attorney’s fees) plus double costs.30 Unless the
appellee asks for such sanctions and thereby gives the
appellant notice, the court of appeals may not summarily
impose sanctions, but must first issue an order requiring the
appellant to show cause why sanctions for a frivolous appeal
should not be imposed.31
18. Issuance of mandate. Sometimes decretal language
specifies the date when the mandate will issue. The mandate is
the formal document that transmits the disposition by the
court of appeals to the district court. It consists of the court of
appeals opinion, a certified copy of the judgment (the judgment
is prepared by the clerk’s office), and any direction as to costs.32
In the absence of any contrary direction, the mandate issues 7
days after the time to file a petition for rehearing (14 days)
expires (i.e., 21 days after entry of the judgment of the court of
appeals), or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely
petition for rehearing or motion to stay the mandate,
whichever is later.33 A timely petition for rehearing
automatically stays issuance of the mandate until the petition
is adjudicated.34
In some cases a panel wants its ruling to take effect
immediately. The decretal language should add “The mandate
shall issue forthwith.” This language, however, does not make
the appellate ruling effective on the date that the opinion is
filed. The effective date is the date when the mandate is

29
30
31
32
33
34

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2000); FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2).
See FED. R. APP. P. 38.
See DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1988).
See FED. R. APP. P. 41(a).
See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b).
See FED. R. APP. P. 41(d)(1).
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issued,35 even if the mandate is not received by the district
court on that date. If a court of appeals wants its ruling to
become effective on the date the opinion is filed, it should make
sure that the clerk of the court issues the mandate that day.
In some cases the panel wants to have the mandate
delayed, usually to permit the losing party to have extra time
to seek a stay from the Supreme Court.36
19. Altering a Court of Appeals opinion. On occasion, a
court of appeals makes some change in its own prior ruling. In
the Second Circuit, this can be accomplished in one of four
ways: (a) if a minor wording change is to be made, the author of
the opinion files an “errata sheet” (on a prescribed form)
correcting the slip opinion; (b) if a more extensive change is to
be made, the panel files an unpublished order directing the
change; (c) if a change is to be made that the panel wants
published in the Federal Reporter, a brief opinion making the
change is filed, (d) if extensive changes are to be made, the
panel files an amended opinion, in which event a new slip
opinion is printed. Whenever any changes are made, a revised
disk containing the opinion as corrected is sent to the clerk’s
office so that a corrected version of the opinion will be placed on
line. If a change is to be made after the mandate has issued,
the amending order must recite that the mandate is being
recalled.
*****
The foregoing describes practices in the Second Circuit.
Variations undoubtedly occur in the other circuits. Although
this Article will not end with any decretal language, it is my
hope that the discussion of decretal language will be useful to
the bench and the bar.

35

See United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 144 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
36
See, e.g., Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2002).

